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Abstract 
Higher managerial and professional occupations are now the most incentivised occupational class in 
Britain. It is not yet known whether the rise in pay for performance (PFP) signifies an erosion or 
enhancement in the ‘service relationship’ that purportedly characterises these occupations. Taking an 
occupational class perspective, this paper investigates the implications of the rise in PFP for the 
employment relationship and conditions of work across the occupational structure using two 
nationally-representative datasets. In fixed-effects estimates, PFP is found to heavily substitute base 
earnings in non-service class occupations, but not in service class occupations. PFP jobs generally 
have no worse conditions relative to non-PFP jobs within occupational classes. The article concludes 
the rise in PFP should be conceptualised more as a form of ‘rent sharing’ for service class 
occupations, enhancing the service relationship, and as a form of ‘risk sharing’ for non-service class 
occupations. 
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MAIN TEXT OF ARTICLE 
Introduction 
Narratives of rising ‘marketization’ and ‘financialization’ depict them as quite negative trends for the 
employment relationship in general (Cushen and Thompson 2016; Thompson 2013). Other accounts 
have been careful to highlight the differential effects across structural locations, focusing on the 
experience of certain ‘occupational elites’ that are said to have used their advantageous positions (see 
Cousins et al. 2018) to economically benefit from such trends, for instance in Piketty’s account of 
‘super managers’ (Piketty 2014). One such trend that is symptomatic of rising marketization and 
financialization is the growth in pay for performance (PFP). Supporting the occupational elites 
perspective, empirical work by sociologists in the United States has indeed shown that the well-
known ratcheting up of senior executive pay is almost entirely accounted for by the explosion in 
performance-related elements of compensation (DiPrete et al. 2010; Kim et al. 2015). Nonetheless, 
the rise in PFP has penetrated the labour market much more widely than within these narrowly 
defined elite categories, and so might its effects on employment relationships. 
Rising rapidly during the 1990s and early 2000s, about one-third of employees in Europe and 
two-fifths in the United States now have some element of their pay based on performance (Bryson et 
al. 2013). What is perhaps less well-known, in Britain at least, is that the incidence of PFP is now 
highest among higher managerial and professional occupations by quite a margin (McGovern et al. 
2007; Williams and Zhou 2016), the vast majority of whom are not senior executives. While the 
differential effects of the financial crisis and ensuing recession, which can be traced to the incentives 
of senior executives (Freeman 2009), on various aspects of the employment relationship such as pay 
stagnation, underemployment, and insecurity, have been extensively studied (Williams 2017a; Gallie 
et al. 2017; Warren 2015; Warren and Lyonette 2018), the differential implications of the growth in 
PFP for employment relationships across the wider occupational structure have been curiously 
overlooked. 
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In this paper, we investigate the differential implications of the rise in PFP for the 
employment relationship from an occupational class perspective. Occupational classes are a technical 
construct delineating broad groupings of occupations that purportedly share similar employment 
relations, which in turn delineate broad positions of labour market advantage and disadvantage 
(Goldthorpe 2007) and so provide a good analytical tool for this paper’s purpose. Proponents of 
occupational class theory might expect that any economic benefits from the rise in PFP to be tilted in 
favour of higher managerial and professional occupations, the ‘service class’ (Breen 1997; Goldthorpe 
2007). However, it is far from clear whether the rise in PFP among higher managerial and 
professional occupations represents an erosion in the privileged ‘service relationship’ typically 
afforded to employees in this occupational class. On the one hand, it could signify, in part, increasing 
marketization of a traditionally privileged employment relationship type, shifting a greater degree of 
income risk onto these workers by substituting base salaries with a contingent component. On the 
other hand, PFP may act as a way of sharing economic rents, offering a mechanism to boost earnings 
of those in already privileged occupational positions as is often assumed in topical debates about the 
PFP among senior executives, ‘super managers’, and ‘elites’, enhancing rather than eroding the 
service relationship through ‘rent sharing’. But this in turn may still come at the expense of other 
traditional features of the service relationship and deteriorate working conditions. For non-service 
class occupations, however, the rise in PFP may mark a further deterioration in an already 
disadvantaged employment relationship type, incorporating a greater degree of ‘risk sharing’ into the 
‘labour contract’. While the growth in pay for performance prior to the financial crisis was found to 
modestly increase wage inequality across the pay distribution (Bryan and Bryson 2016), the 
implications of this trend for occupationally-differentiated employment relationships has not been 
studied in detail. This paper aims to fill this gap by examining two nationally-representative datasets 
for Britain conducted in the 1990s and 2010s. 
 
Occupational class and the rise in pay for performance 
The Goldthorpe model of occupationally-differentiated employment relationships 
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The influential Goldthorpe (2007) model of occupational class purports that employment relationships 
emerge from the inherent ‘contractual hazard’ in defining the terms of an employment contract. The 
possible ‘solutions’ cluster around two polar extremes: a ‘service relationship’ and a ‘labour contract’, 
with other ‘mixed forms’ in between. Under service relationships, employees are said to provide a 
‘service’ to employers in return for a fixed salary and enjoy a greater degree of job (and income) 
security, promotion (and higher income) prospects to tie employees to the firm and develop their 
skills since there are mutual gains in doing so. Conversely, labour contracts are more akin to ‘spot 
contracts’, where tenures are typically shorter in duration and offer fewer opportunities for (income) 
advancement. Which solution to the contractual hazard is adopted depends on two main 
characteristics of work: how difficult work is to monitor and the ‘human asset specificity’ required to 
perform the job. Because differences in these two salient job characteristics vary across occupations, 
this in turn gives rise to differentiation in employment relationships across broad occupational classes. 
This model of occupationally-differentiated employment relationships has been repeatedly 
validated over a number of years and provides the basis for the Office for National Statistics’ Socio-
Economic Classification (NS-SEC) schema of occupational classes in Britain for more than a decade 
(Rose and Pevalin 2005). Much empirical support has been found for the construct and criterion 
validity of the resulting broad occupational class categories (Evans and Mills 1998, 2000; McGovern 
et al. 2007; Zou 2015; Williams 2017b). The basic model, the occupational classes delineated by the 
NS-SEC version, and example occupations in each class are listed in Table 1.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Nonetheless, the theory is not without controversy, not least due to the constant flux in work 
organisation and the growing marketization restructuring the employment relationship within and 
across classes over the years (Gallie et al. 1998; McGovern et al. 2007; White et al. 2004; also see 
Williams 2017b). Payment systems have traditionally been a fundamental variable in differentiating 
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employment relationship types and occupational classes. Indeed, alternative labels for the main 
occupational class divide in the Goldthorpe model make explicit reference to payment systems—the 
‘salariat’ (salaried) and ‘wage labour’ (hourly-paid) occupational classes. One major trend with 
respect to payment systems over the last two to three decades has been the growth in the incidence of 
PFP, yet little is known about the implications of this trend for employment relationships in general 
and its differential impact across the occupational class spectrum in particular. Instead, sociological 
studies have largely focused on the rise in PFP among senior executives (DiPrete et al. 2010; Kim et 
al. 2015). 
 
The rise in pay for performance and the service relationship 
The theories underlying Goldthorpe model generally imply greater use of PFP for service class 
occupations. Principal-agent theory, for instance, states PFP is most appropriate in situations where 
the monitoring of work effort is costliest such as in service class occupations, while paying for time is 
preferred where close supervision of work is easy such as in semi-routine and routine occupations 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Moreover, PFP can act as a way to retain valuable specific human 
capital as a form of ‘efficiency wage’ (Akerlof 1982). Empirical research has generally found PFP-use 
is greatest where work is difficult to monitor and where human asset specificity is high (Williams, 
Zhou, and Zou 2019). Indeed, PFP is often taken as an indictor of the service relationship, while 
overtime pay an indicator of the labour contract characterised by ‘discrete amounts of effort for 
discrete amounts of reward’ (Evans and Mills 1998, 2000; Zou 2015). While the use of overtime pay 
declined during the last two decades, PFP rose substantially (Bryson et al. 2013). 
While a general growth in PFP is expected in narratives of increasing marketization and 
financialization and in accounts of ‘elites’ and ‘super managers’, what is perhaps less well-known is 
how the diffusion in PFP was much broader but also uneven across occupational classes. Although the 
underlying theory of the Goldthorpe model might predict this given that contractual hazards are 
greatest in service class occupations. McGovern et al. (2007: 166-8) found the prevalence of PFP was 
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relatively even across classes in 1992 but by 2000 the higher managerial and professional occupations 
emerged as the most incentivised occupational class—largely as a result of increasingly being 
subjected to combinations of individual and group incentives. Growth in organisational PFP (profit-
sharing and employee share ownership schemes) did not grow, however. They found that the well-
known pay premium to PFP was relatively similar across occupational classes and found no adverse 
effects of PFP on work demands and work strain. On the surface, these findings imply the rise in PFP 
in the 1990s neither eroded nor enhanced the service relationship. Nonetheless, the trend towards 
greater PFP prevalence in higher managerial and professional occupations and associated premium 
may have come at the expense of other traditional elements of the service relationship such as 
opportunities for promotion and job security, but this thesis remains untested. 
It is therefore still unclear whether the rise in PFP represents an enhancement or erosion in the 
service relationship. While empirical research often finds a pay premium for PFP, this does not 
signify a strengthening per se since much of the premium is often also found to reflect a large degree 
of unobserved heterogeneity. The PFP pay premium substantially shrinks in panel studies that control 
for individual fixed-effects (e.g., Bryan and Bryson 2016; Bryson et al. 2014; Green and Heywood 
2017; Stokes et al. 2017). Moreover, Green and Heywood (2017) in the British Household Panel 
Survey 1997 to 2008 show that PFP often substantially substitutes for base earnings such that 
simplistic estimates of the PFP pay premium may therefore overstate the financial benefit of PFP, 
even when taking unobserved heterogeneity into account. 
Various attempts have tried to rationalise trends such as the rise in PFP within a conventional 
occupational class framework. For instance, Breen (1997) points out that although employers try to 
offload risk onto their employees where they can, this does not necessarily negate the economic 
rationale for the service relationship. With respect to PFP, Author A and Author B (2016) using the 
2011 Work Employment and Relations Survey find that, even within workplaces, employers seem to 
be more likely to implement PFP among service class occupations relative to other occupational 
classes—about twice as likely. If PFP represents a risk insofar as it varies pay according to 
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individual/group performance and/or the financial health of the organisation, this risk appears to be 
overwhelmingly on the shoulders of service class occupations. 
Goldthorpe (2007) himself was critical of the view that rise in new forms of work 
organisation among service class occupations should be taken as an indicator of the decline of the 
service relationship. Goldthorpe (2007: 122) states two conditions must be met for a compelling 
argument for a general decline in the service relationship: First, there must be direct evidence that 
shows elements of the service relationship that were previously typical are discontinued. Second, the 
change is permanent as opposed to a short-term blip coinciding with economic cycles or management 
fads. For specifically pay for performance, to this we add that more exploration on its functioning, its 
nature, is required. Is pay for performance added on top of base earnings as we would expect within 
the service relationship or does it substitute for base earnings as we might expect within the labour 
contract? Are any possible non-pecuniary benefits (drawbacks) of PFP associated with scaled back 
(improved) elements of the service relationship elsewhere? For instance, does PFP increasingly 
substitute for opportunities for promotion or other prospective benefits such as pensions? And for all 
questions, for whom? Given the logic of the distinction between the service relationship and the 
labour contract, which are strongly tied to occupational position, the expectation of the sceptical view 
that new forms of work organisation do not negate the economic rationale for the service relationship 
is that the rise in PFP should have had no effect on the fundamentals of the differentiation in 
employment contracts, or if anything, enhancing rather than eroding the service relationship.  
 As topical as PFP has been, especially among certain narrow ‘elite’, ‘super managers’, and 
senior executive factions of service class occupations engaging in rent extraction through ever higher 
bonuses (DiPrete et al. 2010), relatively little sociological work exists on interpreting its rise across 
the wider occupational spectrum (c.f. McGovern et al. 2007). The analysis that follows is guided by 
the following three questions: 
1. Has the rise in PFP among service class occupations, in particular higher managerial and 
professional occupations, been permanent? 
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2. Does PFP complement or substitute base earnings? How does this vary across occupational 
classes? 
3. Does the data support the notion that PFP is associated with inferior employment 
relationships or working conditions within occupational classes? 
 
Method 
Data 
To answer these questions, we turn to two complementary long running British surveys. The first is 
the Skills and Employment Surveys (SES) (Felstead et al. 2014). SES has been providing a nationally-
representative portrait of the British labour market since 1986. The main advantage for SES for our 
purposes is that it asked identical questions on PFP in 1992, 2001, 2006, and 2012 (the latest wave)—
allowing an over time analysis in occupational class and PFP.i An advantage of SES is that it asks 
respondents on different types of PFP. Additionally, SES asked a variety of detailed questions on 
aspects of employment relationships and job quality and also includes a rich set of controls. Since our 
focus is on employees, we exclude the self-employed, yielding an analytical sample of 15,401 cases 
across the four waves. After excluding cases with missing data, we are left with a final sample of 
around 14,000 cases. 
Although SES contains earnings data, it does not contain information on the size of the PFP 
component. This makes it difficult to assess the extent to which PFP acts as a substitute or 
complement to base earnings. Therefore we also draw upon the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) 2005 to 2015 (ONS 2016). ASHE is an employer survey based on a roughly 1 per cent 
nationally-representative sample of the British labour force drawn from tax records. Covered by the 
Statistics Trade Act, sampled employers must fill out the survey by law. Consequently, response rates 
are high and item non-response is low. ASHE contains detailed information on components of 
earnings often unavailable in household surveys such as shift premiums, over time rates, etc—and 
since 2002—pay from incentive and bonus schemes. An additional advantage of ASHE is that it is a 
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panel dataset by design since national insurance numbers (the sampling unit) are unique to specific 
individuals and do not change. Employees are therefore followed throughout their working lives even 
if they change employer. We use ASHE since 2005 because the way PFP was recorded changed (and 
improved). We focus on annual earnings of employees who were with their employer for the full year 
as bonuses are highly seasonal (Forth et al. 2016). Employees not on the adult rate (i.e., apprentices) 
and whose earnings were affected by absence are excluded (about 7 per cent of the sample), yielding a 
final sample of around 950,000 cases. 
 
Measures and analytical strategy 
SES asks respondents whether an element of their pay is based on performance in some way and 
allows respondents to select as many that apply from a choice of PFP based on individual, team, or 
organisational performance. ASHE asks employers to report the amount of pay that is based on 
incentives or bonus schemes such as profit sharing, productivity, performance and other bonus or 
incentive pay, piecework, and commission. PFP jobs in ASHE can be identified as jobs where the PFP 
component is nonzero.ii These variables and various recodings of them form the main independent 
variables in our analysis. We deflate all analysis of earnings and PFP amount by the 2015 CPI. 
Occupational class in both surveys is defined by the NS-SEC schema following the standardised 
procedures (Rose and Pevalin 2005) to form the six broad occupational categories in Table 1. 
In the SES analysis, control variables fall into two main categories: individual characterises 
and workplace characteristics. With respect to the former, we include whether female (dummy), 
whether ethnic minority (dummy), whether married (dummy), whether have children under 16 
(dummy), whether has a degree-level qualification (dummy), years of work experience (five 
dummies), whether part-time (dummy), hours (logarithm), and whether contract is temporary 
(dummy). With respect to the workplace factors we include whether covered by a union (dummy), 
workplace size (four dummies), industrial sector (four dummies), and region (five dummies). Since 
ASHE is an employer survey, the available controls are necessarily less complete than SES. In our 
11 
 
ASHE analysis, the control variables are whether female (dummy), age (five dummies), tenure (five 
dummies), whether part-time (dummy), hours (logarithm), whether contract is temporary (dummy), 
public sector (dummy), industrial sector (four dummies), region (five dummies), and year (dummies). 
The analysis proceeds in two main steps. First, descriptive patterns are explored with 
questions 1 and 2 on the permanency in the rise and nature of PFP across classes in mind. Second, we 
shift to a multivariate analysis and focus on the predicted differences in the outcome variables 
between PFP and non-PFP jobs within occupational classes using ordinary least squares if the 
dependent variable is continuous or logistic regression if the dependent variable is dichotomous, 
controlling for the factors mentioned above which vary according to whether SES or ASHE is used. 
The purpose of the multivariate analysis is to examine whether the pay of PFP jobs significantly differ 
from non-PFP jobs within classes in terms of (1) their overall earnings, (2) the extent to which PFP 
complements or substitutes base earnings, and finally, (3) differences in broader aspects of 
employment relationships and working conditions.  
While the estimation of (1) and (3) are relatively straightforward, which involves interacting a 
PFP dummy variable with occupational class categories then calculating the differences between PFP 
and non-PFP jobs within classes using the first derivatives (in the case of OLS regressions models) or 
average partial effects (in the case of the logistic regression models), (2) requires a little more 
elaboration. We follow the approach of Green and Heywood (2017) who use the amount of annual 
PFP (in £s) as a key independent variable and overall annual earnings as the dependent variable (in 
£s). We interact PFP amount with occupational class and obtain the derivatives of PFP on earnings 
within classes for this analysis. If PFP substitutes for base earnings, this effect within a given class 
will be less than 1: i.e., £1 worth of PFP increases overall earnings by an amount less than £1. If PFP 
is an example of bonus and is simply added on top of earnings, then £1 worth of PFP increases 
earnings by more than 1. 
Since we are interested in differences between PFP and non-PFP jobs within occupational 
classes, the effects we present are obtained from calculating derivatives/average partial effects from 
interactions between PFP job/PFP amount and occupational class categories (full underlying results of 
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all analyses available on request).iii Since the focus in (1) and (2) is on earnings, these analyses are 
conducted using ASHE, while (3) is conducted on SES using eight separate indicators. The indictors 
of the service employment relationship are: (1) whether the probability of promotion in the next five 
years is 50 per cent or greater; (2) whether have an employer pension; (3) whether received training in 
the last 12 months; (4) and whether there is a likelihood of losing one’ job in the next 12 months. 
These indicators are chosen as either these items or similar have been used to validate the 
occupational class schema used here or predecessors (Evans and Mills 1998, 2000; McGovern et al. 
2007; Williams 2017b).  
The four indicators of wider working conditions are: (1) whether the respondent reports being 
‘very closely supervised’ in their job (dummy); (2) an index of task discretion (averaging responses 
across four items with responses ranging from 0 ‘none at all’ to 3 ‘a great deal’: how much influence 
the respondent has over how hard they work, what tasks they do, how to do their tasks, and deciding 
quality standards; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78); (3) the logarithm of usual hours worked per week 
including paid and unpaid overtime; (4) an index of job strain (averaging across three items with 
responses ranging from 0 ‘never’ to 6 ‘all of the time’: how much the respondent worries about their 
work, they find it difficult to unwind at the end of the workday, and they feel used up at the end of the 
workday; Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80). These indicators are chosen as they have been used to reflect key 
dimensions of job quality in previous analyses of the SES (Felstead et al. 2015; McGovern et al. 
2007). 
 
Results 
Descriptive patterns 
Table 2 reports that the proportion of employees receiving some element of their pay based on 
performance grew from around 30 per cent in 1992 to around 40 per cent by 2001, then remained at 
roughly this level for the next decade. Similar trends of growth during the 1990s followed by broad 
stability after 2001 can be found with respect to all PFP types, including multiple types of PFP. These 
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descriptive patterns largely reflect those in the earlier analyses 1992 to 2000 (McGovern et al. 2007). 
Our updated findings show that the trends have not reversed, nor was there any further growth in PFP 
generally or specific PFP types either. 
 Figure 1 breaks down the growth in PFP by PFP type and occupational class. While there was 
some growth in PFP between 1992 and 2001 in all classes, the growth was most striking among 
higher managerial and professional occupations. Additionally, most of the growth in PFP among 
higher managerial and professional occupations was in multiple types of PFP. PFP is lowest in semi-
routine and routine occupations, where it has even fallen slightly in more recent years. Overall, not 
only is PFP greatest in higher managerial and professional occupations, relative differences between 
this occupational class and others have not reversed. If anything, they slightly widened. 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
An advantage of ASHE is that it breaks down components of earnings into their constituent 
parts. When examining the average proportion of earnings accounted for by PFP across occupational 
classes 2005 to 2015 in Figure 2, it is evident that the proportion of PFP has been falling within all 
classes over this period. Higher managerial and professional occupations have higher proportion of 
overall pay accounted for by PFP than all other classes whether considering PFP jobs only or all jobs, 
followed by lower managerial and professional occupations. While there are some signs the overall 
growth in PFP may have reversed in terms of a fall in the proportion of earnings accounted by PFP in 
recent years, overall patterns of class differences have not. Higher managerial and professional 
occupations are still very much the most incentivised class. 
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Multivariate analysis 
Next we turn to the association between PFP and earnings. In Table 3, we present the differences in 
average predicted effects between PFP and non-PFP jobs within each occupational class obtained 
from an interaction between occupational class categories and a PFP job dummy. We find a 
significant and sizeable premium, a reasonably well-known finding in previous research. However, 
we find there are substantial differences in the magnitude of the premium across classes. The 
premium is much larger for higher managerial and professional occupations—about twice as large as 
most other classes at around 30 per cent (Panel A). The PFP pay differences within classes have 
remained relatively constant over time. Another finding from previous research which is supported by 
our occupational class analysis is that much of the apparent pay premium can be explained by 
unobserved individual heterogeneity (Bryan and Bryson 2016; Bryson et al. 2014; Green and 
Heywood 2017; Stokes et al. 2017). Controlling for individual-specific fixed-effects in the final 
column of Table 3, we too find the magnitude of the PFP premium shrinks—by about 50 per cent, and 
this is roughly constant across classes. 
Although insightful that the pay premium is larger for higher managerial and professional 
occupations relative to other classes, what is of primary interest to the research questions posed earlier 
is the extent to which PFP pay complements or substitutes base pay and how this varies across 
classes. As previously mentioned, to explore this we follow the approach of Green and Heywood 
(2017) by examining the effect size of PFP amount (in £s) on overall earnings, which gives the effect 
of a £1 increase in PFP on total annual earnings. An effect greater than 1 implies that PFP is acting as 
a complement to base earnings while an effect less than 1 indicates that as PFP increases, overall pay 
increases less than the value of PFP, implying base earnings are being substituted by PFP.  
In Table 4, we find that the effect is greater than 1 for most years and occupational classes in 
the cross-sectional analyses. However, as demonstrated in our earlier analysis, much of this is due to 
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unobserved heterogeneity. In the fixed-effects estimates, for higher managerial and professional 
occupations, a £1 increase in PFP results in a 97p increase to overall earnings i.e., on average there is 
a tiny substitution effect of 3p for every £1 in PFP. The effect is so close to 1 that the substitution 
effect is not substantively meaningful. The effect for lower managerial and professional occupations 
is, too, almost 1 (99p), and close to 1 in intermediate occupations too (92p), also implying a very 
small degree of substitution (1p and 8p for every £1 of PFP respectively). PFP in all other classes, 
however, shows a clear and substantively large substitution effect. The substitution effect is 
particularly substantial for routine occupations where for every £1 of PFP, earnings increase by only 
40p. In other words, for every extra £1 of PFP, base earnings are reduced by 60p.  
Overall, then, PFP does not come at any meaningful expense to base earnings in service class 
occupations, while the opposite is the case for all other occupational classes. PFP seems to be acting 
as  a ‘bonus’ added on top of earnings within service class occupations and more consistent with a 
substitute in other occupational classes,  more like a piece rate, exposing PFP jobs to greater earnings 
risk than non-PFP jobs. In an Online Appendix, we report several robustness checks, which lend 
support to this occupational class-biased interpretation. 
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Having established that PFP is generally associated with a pay premium that does not 
meaningfully substitute base earnings for service class occupations (and to a lesser extent intermediate 
occupations) but does substitute in other occupational classes, we now move on to examine the 
connection between PFP and broader aspects of the employment relationship and working conditions. 
The logic for doing so is that perhaps the beneficial effects of PFP jobs for service class occupations 
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might come at the cost elsewhere in other more traditional aspects of the service relationship. 
Similarly, for PFP jobs in the non-service class occupations, these too could also be accompanied by 
an even more extreme labour contract in other areas. Are PFP jobs associated with inferior contractual 
arrangements relative to non-PFP jobs within occupational classes? 
Table 5 examines gaps in four employment relationship indicators between PFP and non-PFP 
jobs within occupational classes, while Table 6 does the same but with four indicators of broader 
working conditions. These estimates are average partial effects obtained from a model interacting PFP 
with occupational class controlling for other factors. These analyses are performed by each SES 
survey wave to examine whether patterns are consistent across years as well as for pooled survey 
years (and including year dummies for the pooled models). Taking the four employment relations 
indicators first (Table 4), we find that in general PFP is associated with higher probability of 
promotion than in non-PFP jobs but is only statistically significant in some cases. Thus on the face of 
it, it seems PFP is not substituting for (or enhancing) prospective promotion opportunities. With 
respect to pensions, we find that in general, PFP is accompanied by a higher probability of having an 
employer pension within classes. For training and job insecurity, we find few statistically significant 
differences between PFP and non-PFP jobs within classes across waves, but no obvious pattern. 
Turning to the four indicators of broader working conditions (Table 5), we find little evidence that 
there are systematic or persistent negative differences between PFP jobs and non-PFP jobs within 
classes on these indicators. The one exception is for working hours. We find that PFP jobs are 
associated with longer hours in both higher managerial and professional and routine occupations, 
about 2 hours extra per week for a standard full-time employee in the former and about 3.5 hours in 
the latter. Overall, then, PFP jobs seem to have no worse employment relationships or broader 
conditions of work, with the exception of hours in the two classes that best typify the extremes of 
employer solutions to the contractual hazard in the employment relationship. 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
17 
 
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
In this article, we assessed the implications of one symptom of increasing ‘marketization’ and 
‘financialization’ for the employment relationship across occupational classes in Britain. While 
general accounts have tended to depict these trends as having quite negative implications for 
employment relationships or instead focused on the economically beneficial effects for senior 
executive elites, we explored the implications PFP across the occupational structure, with a particular 
focus on the experience of the much broader higher managerial and professional occupations where 
the growth in PFP was sharpest. We find that PFP is still highest among higher managerial and 
professional occupations, both in incidence and in proportion of overall earnings. Although an 
earnings premium can be identified for PFP jobs relative to non-PFP jobs within all occupational 
classes, much of this effect is attributable to unobserved heterogeneity. Importantly, in terms of the 
nature of PFP, it only meaningfully substitutes base earnings in non-service class occupations. In 
service class occupations, PFP acts more or less like a bonus added on top of base earnings. 
Furthermore, PFP does not seem to be accompanied with worse employment relationships or 
conditions of work, with the exception of longer working hours in PFP jobs for both higher 
managerial and professional occupations and routine occupations. 
Our findings have several theoretical implications. For occupational class theory, while 
Goldthorpe was critical of the rise in certain management practices signifying an erosion in the 
economic rationale for occupational class-based employment relationships, and the service 
relationship in particular, he notes that, in general “employers should try to exploit any changes in the 
labour market or other economic conditions that might enable them to modify contracts of 
employment […] in ways that would be to their advantage […] that would reduce their contractual 
hazard” (Goldthorpe 2007: 120, emphasis in the original). As our findings demonstrate, the rise in 
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PFP among higher managerial and professional occupations—where contractual hazards are 
purported the greatest—is consistent with this view. The trend towards greater PFP coverage seems to 
have been, if anything, broadly beneficial to service class occupations, straightforwardly boosting the 
earnings of PFP jobs there. Also consistent with our findings is the view that “some of the strategies 
that employers may pursue in search of greater flexibility need have little or no impact on the service 
relationship per se, and indeed may even help to make this relationship more viable” (Goldthorpe 
2007: 120, emphasis in the original). As we have shown, PFP is associated with longer hours for 
higher managerial and professional occupations, perhaps indicating that extra demands in certain 
occupations are being rewarded through PFP schemes. The experience of service class occupations is 
in sharp contrast to the experience of semi-routine and routine occupations where PFP acts more like 
a piece rate, heavily substituting base earnings. Although the growth in PFP should not be 
overemphasised given the declining share of earnings being accounted for by PFP schemes, for 
service class occupations at least, we find PFP appears to act more like a form of ‘rent sharing’, while 
it may plausibly described as a form of ‘risk sharing’ for other occupational classes. 
Reflecting on our findings more widely, although the effects of these trends are likely highly 
moderated by national-level institutional structures of course (Lallement 2011; Vidal 2013), our 
findings have several theoretical implications on debates concerning the broader narratives of 
‘marketization’ and ‘financializaiton’ of employment relationships. First, while narratives of 
marketization and financialization depict these as negative trends for employment relationships in 
general, by adopting a more nuanced occupational class perspective, our findings quite clearly 
demonstrate, in the case of the rise in PFP at least, that the greater risk implied by such schemes really 
only applies to non-service class occupations. In doing so, we highlight the uneven distributional 
implications of this trend and that any narrative really needs to highlight that trends are very often 
polarised according to pre-existing positions of advantage and disadvantage. Second, while existing 
accounts tend to focus on ‘elites’, ‘super managers’, and senior executives—especially with respect to 
the rise in PFP—our findings show that the privileged groups are actually much broader. No doubt 
these narrow occupational groups disproportionally benefited from these wider trends relative to any 
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other, however, our findings highlight perhaps the same processes (though smaller in magnitude) 
might be at work in service class occupations more broadly, even in the public sector and non-finance 
sectors (see Supplementary Appendix). Instead of ‘super managers’ maybe we should also be talking 
about the rise of the ‘super service class’. Our final point, then, is that occupational class should 
feature more as a useful theoretical and empirical tool in sociological understanding regarding the 
broad distributional effects of such trends for the employment relationship. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. The NS-SEC schema of occupations and accompanying employment relationship type 
NS-SEC category 
Employment 
relationship 
% all 
employees Largest 3 SOC 2000 occupations (4-digit) 
Higher managerial 
and professional 
occupations 
Service 11 
Marketing and sales managers; Production, 
works, and maintenance managers; 
Software professionals. 
Lower managerial 
and professional 
occupations 
Service 29 
Nurses; Medical radiographers; Secondary 
education teaching professionals; Primary 
and nursery education teaching 
professionals. 
Intermediate 
occupations 
Mixed 16 
Customer care occupations; Police officers 
(sergeant and below); Call centre 
agents/operators. 
Lower supervisory 
and technical 
occupations 
Mixed 10 
Sales and retail assistants (supervisor); 
Cleaners (supervisor); Heavy goods vehicle 
drivers (supervisor). 
Semi-routine 
occupations 
Labour 
contract 
21 
Sales and retail assistants; Kitchen and 
catering assistants; Retail cashiers and 
check-out operators. 
Routine 
occupations 
Labour 
contract 
13 
Cleaners; Heavy goods vehicle drivers; 
Other goods handling and storage 
occupations not elsewhere classified. 
Sources: Author A (2017). Employees aged 20 to 60 in the 2012 British Skills and Employment Survey. Data 
are weighted. 
 
Table 2. The growth in pay for performance (%) 
 1992 2001 2006 2012 
Any PFP type 30.4 39.5 39.8 38.9 
Any individual PFP 16.5 25.6 29.1 28.1 
Any team PFP 5.8 15.2 15.9 17.9 
Any organisational PFP 22.4 27.9 27.4 27.2 
> 1 PFP type 11.2 20.3 22.1 22.7 
Source: Employees aged 20 to 60 in the British Skills and Employment Surveys. Data are weighted. 
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Table 3. The PFP earnings premium across occupational classes 
 2005 (OLS) 2010 (OLS) 2015 
(OLS) 
2005 to 
2015 (OLS) 
2005 to 
2015 (FE) 
Panel A: Whether have PFP (total annual earnings, log £s) 
Higher man/prof 0.262*** 
(0.007) 
0.268*** 
(0.007) 
0.287*** 
(0.007) 
0.284*** 
(0.002) 
0.106*** 
(0.002) 
Lower man/prof 0.128*** 
(0.006) 
0.119*** 
(0.006) 
0.137*** 
(0.006) 
0.142*** 
(0.002) 
0.0749*** 
(0.002) 
Intermediate 0.0746*** 
(0.007) 
0.0814*** 
(0.007) 
0.127*** 
(0.007) 
0.108*** 
(0.002) 
0.0617*** 
(0.002) 
Supervisory/technical 0.0770*** 
(0.011) 
0.104*** 
(0.013) 
0.166*** 
(0.012) 
0.117*** 
(0.004) 
0.0568*** 
(0.003) 
Semi-routine 0.120*** 
(0.007) 
0.140*** 
(0.008) 
0.165*** 
(0.008) 
0.142*** 
(0.002) 
0.0629*** 
(0.002) 
Routine 0.110*** 
(0.008) 
0.0908*** 
(0.009) 
0.138*** 
(0.008) 
0.117*** 
(0.003) 
0.0567*** 
(0.002) 
R2 0.455 0.455 0.459 0.451 0.126 
Observations 87,264 81,962 91,289 962,652 871,149 
Panel B: Whether have PFP (total annual earnings, £s) 
Higher man/prof 11772.35*** 
(346.70) 
11660.05*** 
(295.31) 
9907.6*** 
(202.25) 
11691.80*** 
(97.82) 
3819.00*** 
(230.59) 
Lower man/prof 3514.75*** 
(310.42) 
3577.95*** 
(270.12) 
3960.15*** 
(183.07) 
3988.60*** 
(88.39) 
1877.75*** 
(82.76) 
Intermediate 400.3*** 
(326.99) 
829.50** 
(294.38) 
1314.15*** 
(210.32) 
945.80*** 
(97.75) 
810.75*** 
(35.57) 
Supervisory/technical 1137.15* 
(553.70) 
1512.00** 
(536.47) 
2310.1*** 
(368.72) 
1527.40*** 
(173.19) 
834.9*** 
(59.32) 
Semi-routine 1167.15** 
(368.96) 
1261.20*** 
(341.08) 
1649.9*** 
(239.70) 
1388.25*** 
(111.35) 
689.65*** 
(31.41) 
Routine 1089.75** 
(421.67) 
904.85* 
(392.00) 
1367.15*** 
(257.06) 
1173.15*** 
(125.46) 
551.15*** 
(30.686) 
R2 0.153 0.198 0.257 0.156 0.161 
Observations 87,267 81,962 91,289 962,664 871,161 
Source: Employees aged 20 to 60 in the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Data are weighted. 
Notes: Predicted differences in PFP and non-PFP jobs within occupational classes derived from an interaction 
between occupational class category and a pay for performance job dummy. All models include a common set 
of controls (see text) which are omitted to save space. Statistical significance * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4. The substitution or complement effect on earnings of PFP across occupational classes 
 2005 (OLS) 2010 (OLS) 2015 
(OLS) 
2005 to 2015 
(OLS) 
2005 to 
2015 (FE) 
Effect of PFP amount on total annual earnings (£s) 
Higher man/prof 1.221*** 
(0.003) 
1.195*** 
(0.004) 
1.522*** 
(0.005) 
1.224*** 
(0.001) 
0.969*** 
(0.091) 
Lower man/prof 1.328*** 
(0.012) 
1.264*** 
(0.008) 
1.754*** 
(0.009) 
1.401*** 
(0.003) 
0.994*** 
(0.044) 
Intermediate 1.318*** 
(0.060) 
1.709*** 
(0.043) 
1.671*** 
(0.059) 
1.512*** 
(0.017) 
0.919*** 
(0.064) 
Supervisory/technical 0.600*** 
(0.103) 
0.815*** 
(0.107) 
1.356*** 
(0.122) 
0.880*** 
(0.040) 
0.577*** 
(0.039) 
Semi-routine 0.915*** 
(0.092) 
1.078*** 
(0.100) 
1.283*** 
(0.084) 
1.162*** 
(0.032) 
0.705*** 
(0.073) 
Routine 0.610*** 
(0.085) 
0.713*** 
(0.114) 
0.934*** 
(0.102) 
0.699*** 
(0.034) 
0.406*** 
(0.031) 
R2 0.648 0.695 0.663 0.682 0.280 
Observations 87,267 81,962 91,289 962,664 871,161 
Source: Employees aged 20 to 60 in the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Data are weighted. 
Notes: See Table 3. Statistical significance * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table 5. Gaps in employment relationship indicators between PFP vs. non-PFP jobs within 
occupational classes 
 1992 2001 2006 2012 Pooled 
Panel A: Probability of promotion >50% (logit, average partial effects) 
Higher man/prof 0.158* 
(0.067) 
 0.102* 
(0.042) 
0.064 
(0.064) 
0.096** 
(0.031) 
Lower man/prof 0.047 
(0.046) 
 0.089** 
(0.034) 
0.089 
(0.050) 
0.081*** 
(0.024) 
Intermediate 0.122** 
(0.046) 
 0.140*** 
(0.037) 
0.210*** 
(0.061) 
0.147*** 
(0.026) 
Supervisory/technical 0.029 
(0.070) 
 -0.052 
(0.059) 
0.012 
(0.095) 
-0.009 
(0.041) 
Semi-routine 0.067 
(0.044) 
 0.065 
(0.040) 
-0.017 
(0.060) 
0.053 
(0.027) 
Routine -0.039 
(0.045) 
 0.091* 
(0.044) 
0.090 
(0.080) 
0.045 
(0.030) 
Pseudo R2 0.117  0.118 0.116 0.111 
Observations 2874  5302 2146 10322 
Panel B: Employer pension (logit, average partial effects) 
Higher man/prof  0.049 
(0.035) 
0.054 
(0.033) 
0.102* 
(0.051) 
0.059** 
(0.022) 
Lower man/prof  0.124*** 
(0.028) 
0.078** 
(0.027) 
0.034 
(0.038) 
0.081*** 
(0.018) 
Intermediate  0.083* 
(0.040) 
0.173*** 
(0.032) 
0.176*** 
(0.051) 
0.143*** 
(0.023) 
Supervisory/technical  0.053 
(0.060) 
0.168*** 
(0.051) 
0.070 
(0.083) 
0.109** 
(0.035) 
Semi-routine  0.215*** 
(0.036) 
0.119** 
(0.041) 
0.089 
(0.057) 
0.148*** 
(0.025) 
Routine  0.096* 
(0.042) 
0.167*** 
(0.039) 
0.028 
(0.071) 
0.117*** 
(0.027) 
Pseudo R2  0.279 0.287 0.319 0.284 
Observations  3753 5303 2147 11203 
Panel C: Training in last 12 months (logit, average partial effects) 
Higher man/prof 0.005 
(0.050) 
0.083 
(0.044) 
0.037 
(0.040) 
0.071 
(0.061) 
0.037 
(0.024) 
Lower man/prof 0.036 
(0.039) 
0.046 
(0.034) 
0.036 
(0.030) 
-0.037 
(0.046) 
0.021 
(0.018) 
Intermediate 0.045 
(0.050) 
0 
(0.044) 
0.087* 
(0.039) 
0.083 
(0.064) 
0.057* 
(0.023) 
Supervisory/technical -0.015 
(0.069) 
0.145* 
(0.066) 
0.076 
(0.062) 
-0.034 
(0.088) 
0.059 
(0.035) 
Semi-routine 0.081 
(0.047) 
0.057 
(0.041) 
0.073 
(0.045) 
0.050 
(0.061) 
0.069** 
(0.024) 
Routine 0.038 
(0.057) 
0.149** 
(0.050) 
0.068 
(0.056) 
0.032 
(0.074) 
0.083** 
(0.030) 
Pseudo R2 0.137 0.107 0.082 0.112 0.100 
Observations 2934 3774 5344 2180 14232 
Panel D: Likelihood of losing job in next 12 months (logit, average partial effects) 
Higher man/prof  0.056 
(0.037) 
-0.012 
(0.039) 
-0.066 
(0.066) 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
Lower man/prof  -0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.014 
(0.025) 
-0.076 
(0.041) 
-0.031 
(0.018) 
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Intermediate  0.011 
(0.027) 
-0.047 
(0.029) 
0.015 
(0.059) 
-0.014 
(0.019) 
Supervisory/technical  -0.042 
(0.048) 
0.010 
(0.052) 
-0.025 
(0.094) 
-0.014 
(0.034) 
Semi-routine  0.044 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.031) 
-0.012 
(0.050) 
0.017 
(0.020) 
Routine  -0.005 
(0.040) 
-0.088** 
(0.033) 
-0.140 
(0.072) 
-0.062* 
(0.025) 
Pseudo R2  0.078 0.071 0.057 0.070 
Observations  3689 5252 2038 10979 
Source: Employees aged 20 to 60 in the British Skills and Employment Surveys. Data are weighted. 
Notes: See Table 3. Blank cells indicate underlying survey items for the dependent variable were not asked that 
year. Statistical significance * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 6. Gaps in working conditions indicators between PFP vs. non-PFP jobs within 
occupational classes 
 1992 2001 2006 2012 Pooled 
Panel A: Very closely supervised (logit, average partial effects) 
Higher man/prof  -0.043* 
(0.019) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.025 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.009) 
Lower man/prof  0.001 
(0.021) 
-0.016 
(0.017) 
0.013 
(0.025) 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
Intermediate  -0.003 
(0.026) 
0.004 
(0.022) 
-0.003 
(0.036) 
0.000 
(0.015) 
Supervisory/technical  -0.060 
(0.051) 
0.057 
(0.035) 
-0.008 
(0.086) 
0.004 
(0.030) 
Semi-routine  0.012 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.042) 
0.007 
(0.020) 
Routine  0.033 
(0.033) 
-0.034 
(0.028) 
0.072 
(0.073) 
0.007 
(0.022) 
Pseudo R2  0.051 0.058 0.083 0.050 
Observations  3770 5338 2177 11285 
Panel B: Task discretion index (OLS) 
Higher man/prof 0.059 
(0.102) 
0.109* 
(0.050) 
0.050 
(0.045) 
0.078 
(0.077) 
0.076* 
(0.031) 
Lower man/prof 0.097* 
(0.045) 
0.157*** 
(0.041) 
0.061 
(0.038) 
0.052 
(0.064) 
0.093*** 
(0.023) 
Intermediate -0.063 
(0.060) 
0.065 
(0.051) 
-0.020 
(0.049) 
0.018 
(0.084) 
-0.002 
(0.029) 
Supervisory/technical -0.156 
(0.099) 
0.026 
(0.086) 
0.079 
(0.074) 
-0.044 
(0.115) 
-0.004 
(0.045) 
Semi-routine 0.081 
(0.071) 
0.049 
(0.064) 
0.005 
(0.062) 
-0.223* 
(0.090) 
-0.005 
(0.036) 
Routine 0.016 
(0.076) 
0.186** 
(0.066) 
0.236** 
(0.073) 
-0.161 
(0.138) 
0.123** 
(0.041) 
R2 0.567 0.615 0.618 0.626 0.601 
Observations 2896 3769 5337 2173 14175 
Panel C: Logarithm of usual total hours of worked per week (OLS) 
Higher man/prof 0.016 
(0.022) 
0.022 
(0.021) 
0.054*** 
(0.016) 
0.067** 
(0.025) 
0.045*** 
(0.010) 
Lower man/prof -0.006 
(0.020) 
0.010 
(0.021) 
0.033 
(0.017) 
0.010 
(0.024) 
0.018 
(0.010) 
Intermediate 0.023 
(0.025) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
0.037 
(0.025) 
0.031 
(0.031) 
0.030* 
(0.013) 
Supervisory/technical -0.026 
(0.034) 
-0.019 
(0.023) 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
0.006 
(0.036) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
Semi-routine 0.034 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
0.001 
(0.029) 
0.004 
(0.035) 
0.006 
(0.014) 
Routine 0.139*** 
(0.026) 
0.086** 
(0.028) 
0.090*** 
(0.025) 
0.134** 
(0.046) 
0.111*** 
(0.015) 
Pseudo R2 0.268 0.269 0.264 0.260 0.267 
Observations 2939 3774 5345 2180  14238 
Panel D: Job strain scale (OLS) 
Higher man/prof -0.126 
(0.127) 
-0.144 
(0.098) 
0.162 
(0.093) 
0.041 
(0.133) 
0.025 
(0.056) 
Lower man/prof 0.044 
(0.097) 
0.039 
(0.089) 
-0.011 
(0.080) 
0.097 
(0.115) 
0.024 
(0.047) 
Intermediate -0.074 
(0.092) 
0.166* 
(0.081) 
0.113 
(0.073) 
0.043 
(0.149) 
0.073 
(0.045) 
30 
 
Supervisory/technical -0.031 
(0.106) 
0.054 
(0.137) 
0.092 
(0.120) 
0.233 
(0.156) 
0.083 
(0.066) 
Semi-routine -0.073 
(0.085) 
0.083 
(0.091) 
-0.041 
(0.086) 
-0.111 
(0.136) 
-0.019 
(0.049) 
Routine -0.083 
(0.098) 
-0.028 
(0.099) 
-0.172 
(0.093) 
-0.124 
(0.159) 
-0.099 
(0.054) 
R2 0.100 0.082 0.093 0.110 0.092 
Observations 2844 3772 5341 2180 14137 
Source: Employees aged 20 to 60 in the British Skills and Employment Surveys. Data are weighted. 
Notes: See Table 5. Statistical significance * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 1. The incidence of PFP combinations by occupational class and year 
 
Source: Employees aged 20 to 60 in the British Skills and Employment Surveys. Data are weighted. 
Notes: HMP = higher managerial and professional; LMP = lower managerial and professional; I = intermediate; 
LST = lower supervisory and technical; SR = semi-routine; R = routine. 
 
Figure 2. PFP as a proportion of annual earnings by occupational class and year 
 
Source: Employees aged 20 to 60 in the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. Data are weighted. 
Notes: See Figure 1 for explanation of abbreviations. 
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